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STATE COURTS AS SOURCES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
HOW TO BECOME INDEPENDENTLY WEALTHY
Jennfer Friesen*
I. INTRODUCTION
My topic today is the future direction of each state's constitu-
tional law of individual rights, law over which state supreme court
judges alone possess final interpretive power, though their power is
often left unused.' Any regular reader of opinions of the high courts
of the fifty states and Puerto Rico can confirm that these courts do
interpret or apply state bills of rights provisions, hundreds of times in
* Professor of Law and Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles,
California. I wish to thank ChiefJustice Randall T. Shepard of Indiana, as well as the
National Center for State Courts, for the opportunity to contribute to this symposium,
and also to thank the participatingjustices for their comments and suggestions.
1 On the meaning of state constitutional rights, the United States Supreme
Court must yield to state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1996) (limiting review of state
court judgments by writ of certiorari to cases with a federal question ); Herb v. Pit-
cairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) ("Our only power over state judgments is to cor-
rect them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights."). Federal trial
courts that have supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1996) to hear
state constitutional law questions are bound by the decisions of the highest court of
the state in which they sit; see, e.g., Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991)
(applying California provisions on separation of church and state); Carerras v. City of
Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying California free expression provi-
sion). If the district court has serious doubts how the state supreme court would
decide a particular issue, it should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction
over the state claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1996), or, if available, use the state's
certification statute to seek clarification from the state's high court. SeeJENNIFER FRIE-
SEN, STATE CONSTITUrLONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DE-
FENSES 31-34 & n.128 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
Members of the state legislative or executive branches are duty bound to comply
with the state constitution, and therefore need to interpret open questions from time
to time, but the state's judicial branch alone possesses the final authoritative voice.
Only subsequent amendments to the state constitution can change, add to, or sub-
tract from, a constitutional right that the court has defined.
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each calendar year.2 In many cases they decide the state question
along with a parallel federal rights claim.3 Sometimes the litigant
2 This is not to say the state law question receives a thorough treatment-often it
appears as an "also ran," summarily decided in the course of a discussion dominated
by federal law precedents. This practice can unnecessarily open up the court's judg-
ment to Supreme Court review and reversal. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983) (requiring a "plain statement" by the state court that it rested its judgment for
the rights claimant on state grounds, independent of any federal law discussion, to
defeat Supreme Court jurisdiction); State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995)
(holding search after traffic stop violated both Ohio Constitution and Fourth Amend-
ment), rev'd sub nom., Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996); STATE CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 50-56.
About a quarter of the states have held instead that they will not address any
federal constitutional claims raised unless all properly raised state law questions have
first been decided adversely to the claimant. When the state law proves adequate to
dispose of the controversy, reaching any federal claims also briefed is unnecessary.
See, e.g., Large v. Superior Ct., 714 P.2d 399, 405 (Ariz. 1986) ("Because petitioner did
not articulate whether he was proceeding under the federal or state due process
clause, and because the provisions of our state constitution settle the matter, we ad-
dress only the state constitutional issue."); Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla.
1992) ("Consistent with federalist principles set forth below, we examine the [defend-
ant's] confessions initially under our state Constitution; only if they pass muster here
need we re-examine them under federal law."); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 751 (La.
1992) ("[We] set to one side, without deciding, the federal constitutional issues and
proceed to resolve this case on state constitutional grounds."); see also STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 27 n.108 (citing and quoting cases from other states).
In civil cases, federal courts adopt the same hierarchy of claims as a form of
judicial restraint, to avoid unnecessary resolution of federal constitutional questions.
See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 293-95 (1982) (noting federal
court of appeals should apply state constitution first in order to avoid a federal issue);
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (federal policy to prefer reso-
lution on state law grounds); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1523 (9th Cir.
1993) ("[A]lthough the plaintiffs' suits allege both federal and state constitutional
violations, we turn first to the California Constitution."); Hewitt, 940 F.2d 1561; Car-
reras, 768 F.2d 1039.
Besides avoiding unnecessary federal constitutional issues, resting decisions ex-
clusively on state law whenever possible saves parties and courts extra costs that could
be imposed by inviting Supreme Court review of a federal holding. See, e.g., Immuno
A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1989) (holding for libel defendant on
First Amendment grounds), vacated and remanded, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990), enforced, 567
N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.) (reinstating original judgment on both federal and state constitu-
tional grounds and commenting on needless expense and delay caused by Supreme
Court review), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
3 State courts are most often called upon to apply federal constitutional rights
imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. A future majority of the
United States Supreme Court could conceivably reduce this contributive role by de-
ciding to "de-incorporate" the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth amendments,
leaving states bound only by the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other federal provisions that ap-
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claiming the protection of the state constitution wins; more often he
or she loses. This is in no way meant to suggest that state constitu-
tional law is too conservative; most assertions of constitutional rights,
state or federal, are unsuccessful. My concern is not especially with
outcomes, but with how state court judicial methodology and craft is
often influenced by federal methodology whenever the court is
presented with parallel state and federal claims.4 Specifically, I want
to question the uncritical adoption, when giving meaning to state con-
stitutional rights, of verbal formulas that the United States Supreme
Court uses to measure federal constitutional rights or powers.5 Some
of this dogma should be laid to rest even by the Supreme Court, as
federal law scholars agree;6 it certainly does not deserve a second life,
released to stalk the pages of the state reports, where, vampire-like, it
sucks the life out of fresh constitutional analysis.
ply directly to the states. That unlikely possibility aside, state court decisions on fed-
eral individual rights will continue to be necessary whenever state law fails to protect
the asserted right, the right is uniquely federal, or no state right has been raised. The
frequency with which future state courts will nee&--as opposed to desire-to rule on
federal rights when parallel state provisions would in fact vindicate the claimant de-
pends on the willingness of the bar and bench to put "state law first." STATE CONSTI-
TtTONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 17.
4 It is true that much of the law review and press commentary on the rights
secured by state constitutions has been merely to urge state judges to "expand" state
bills of rights, or to applaud them for doing so, especially when state law might dictate
a result different from an unwelcome federal precedent. That so much of the com-
mentary might be called result-driven is not surprising: much legal commentary, in-
cluding that on federal constitutional law, argues for one outcome or another without
challenging the court's underlying methodology. And it is results that catch head-
lines and fire advocates, not necessarily soundly crafted opinions. In any event, it is
clearly past time for commentators, as well as judges and attorneys, to devote more
energy to methodology, and not to use state bills of rights as federal "look-a-likes" that
can be made to pop out a more pleasing result by applying a different balance.
5 Supreme Court boilerplate that is the least deserving, yet the most likely, to be
so favorably received includes the "reasonable expectation of privacy" in search and
seizure cases, see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text; for equality and speech
provisions, the "suspect" classes and "fundamental" rights that merit protection if
"strict scrutiny" does not uncover a "compelling state interest;" see infra notes 72-85
and accompanying text, and the aging three-part inquiry of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), for deciding questions of religious establishment, despite detailed
and multiple religion clauses that, in most states, clearly dictate a stricter separation of
church and state than does the text of the Federal First Amendment.
6 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. Riv. 2417 (1996) (arguing that a federal rule that a "com-
pelling state interest" justifies content-based restrictions on free speech is wrong both
descriptively and normatively, and distracts us from formulating a better, categorical
approach).
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But-asjudges, attorneys and students alike point out-there is a
lot of federal mimicry of this kind out there, in both state constitu-
tional precedents and appellate briefs, where it grows like kudzu
vines. My remarks thus unavoidably raise the question whether there
is any value in creating an independent body of state constitutional
doctrine, when a state court can achieve its desired result in particular
cases without it.7 Without independent rules, a state court has the
option of routinely following, for state constitutional purposes,
whatever the Supreme Court has done; in doubtful cases it can make
an educated guess about what the Supreme Court would do.8 If a
7 For example, the members of the Supreme Court of California have sometimes
placed little value in this endeavor, as illustrated by recent caselaw. In Smith v. Fair
Employment &Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996), the court decided as a matter
of federal law that the owner of an apartment building could not, on the grounds that
it offended her religious scruples, lawfully refuse to rent to an unmarried couple, and
sustained sanctions against her for statute-based housing discrimination. Since the
rights claimant had lost under the Federal Religious Freedoms Restoration Act
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1996), and the First Amendment, she had a right to a
reasoned decision whether application of the state statute to her business nevertheless
violated the California Declaration of Rights. To this argument, the court plurality
responded somewhat evasively:
That the state Constitution's free exercise clause is more protective of reli-
gious exercise than the federal Constitution's free exercise clause has also
been suggested. No court, however, has articulated a test more protective
than the test... now codified in RFRA. Because Smith's claim fails even
under that test .... we need not address the scope and proper interpretation
of California Constitution article I, section 4. These important questions
should await a case in which their resolution affects the outcome.
Smith, 913 P.2d at 931. But of course these "important questions" could have been
crucial to this particular outcome, particularly as Justice Mosk, who cast the necessary
fourth vote for the plurality disposition, would have held RFRA unconstitutional. See
also Sands v. Morongo Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (1991) (invalidating practice of al-
lowing religious invocations at public high school graduations under both the state
and the federal constitutions by a plurality, while two concurring justices rested the
result on the Federal First Amendment, treating the state constitution as practically
immaterial, though First Amendment precedents were not clear on the issue). In
Sands, Justice Mosk pointed out the illogic of deliberately bypassing the state's organic
law in order to open up the decision to federal review:
The ChiefJustice virtually begs the Supreme Court to relieve us of our duty
under the Constitution of California. Such a supplication is unprecedented.
We are not a branch of the federal judiciary; we are a court created by the
Constitution of California and we owe our primary obligation to that funda-
mental document.
Id. at 835 (Mosk, J., concurring).
8 The California court happened to guess correctly in Sands, 809 P.2d 809, as
shown by the later Lee v. Weisman, 507 U.S. 577 (1992); but the Ohio court guessed
incorrectly in State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995) (holding search after
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state supreme court finds unsound, for whatever reason, a Supreme
Court ruling in favor of the state regarding, say, a police search, it can
retain the federal framework and change the outcome by differently
weighing a "governmental interest," as the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan did,9 or by crediting citizens with a higher "expectation of pri-
vacy," as the Supreme Court of Colorado and other state courts have
done.10 If there is no practical value in the enterprise of creating in-
dependent doctrine, then it is a waste of time to suggest it.
But I believe there is great value in this enterprise. The call to
create a truly independent set of constitutional rules at the state level
is one that responds to the demands of craft, logic and pragmatism,
and not necessarily to the call of any ideological agenda, whether of
the left or the right. Independent methodology may or may not
"broaden" a state search and seizure clause beyond the fourth amend-
ment, but broadening rights is not its purpose." The point is that no
test for judicial review of constitutional rights, Whether of the balanc-
ing, multi-factor, or categorical variety, should be embraced without
first testing it against criteria of good governance. 12 A conscientious
traffic stop violated both Ohio Constitution and Fourth Amendment), rev'd sub nom.,
Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
9 Sitz v. Departrherit of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993), on remand
after Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety roadblock).
10 See, e.g., People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992) (holding state constitu-
tion protects expectation of privacy in trash left at curb and rejecting California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)); see cases cited in STATE CONsTUTIoNAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 617 nn.108-12. Of course, state courts do not merely react to what the
Supreme Court has already ruled. The Hawai'i Supreme Court, while using federal
type tests to implement the state bill of rights, has a history of independent outcomes
that are not triggered by the desire to reject a Supreme Court precedent. Thus, in
State v. Tanka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1985), the court ruled years before Greenwood that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their trash bags. See also Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (using federal model of tiers of scrutiny for types of
discrimination, but departing from federal law by declaring gender to be "suspect
classification" under the Hawai'i Constitution), on remand sub. nom, Baehr v. Miike,
Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
11 As ChiefJustice Randall Shepard of Indiana has aptly stated, "[T]he continu-
ing strength of this movement does not derive from a desire to continue, at the state
level, the agenda of the Warren-Brennan Court. It derives from the aspiration of state
court judges to be independent sources of law." Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing
Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 421 (1996). Chief
Justice Shepard's illustrations of good independent constructions of a state constitu-
tional provision include a sampling of pre-1977 decisions, id. at 424-29, and more
recent developments of free speech and equality provisions, id. at 444-56.
12 For example, in remarks delivered at a conference on the vogue of federal
balancing tests, Professor Kathleen Sullivan's contribution asks whether balancing
tests or categorical rules are most likely to enhance rights and concludes that the
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state judge wants rules to be coherent, intelligible, workable, and at
least somewhat predictable, especially to members of the other two
branches of government-not to mention the trial courts-who must
conduct themselves according to these rules every day. He or she also
wants, if possible, to write opinions that have a reasonable degree of
precedential value, not conclusions hung upon formulas of judicial
review so ad hoc and elastic that they unnecessarily hamper lawyers'
ability to advise their clients what the court means to do with the next
case.
Every state public servant, from elected state representatives
asked to vote on questionable legislation, to the janitorial supervisor
at a rural school district faced with discharging an employee, can ex-
pect, at some time, to make a constitutional law decision in the course
of his or her official duties. Law enforcement officers are forced to do
so under stressful conditions on a near daily basis. It should be as-
sumed that all public servants want to comply with the state constitu-
tion (though not necessarily that they have done so). Inadvertent
violations of citizens' rights will decrease-surely a goal of good gov-
ernance-in direct relation to the clarity and workability of the lines
judges and other rulemakersI3 devise. When law professors find ex-
plaining and applying the Supreme Court's fragmented Fourth
Amendment opinions next to impossible, what chance has a responsi-
ble police officer in the field to get it right? 14 Some theorists assert
that advocates of independent state jurisprudence hold as an ultimate
objective "the creation in each state of ajurisprudence that is uniquely
answer depends on who is on the Supreme Court and who is devising the categories
or performing the balancing. She closes with the statement: "I do not think the
choice between categorization and balancing will ever go away, but I think which you
like depends on whose ox is being gored." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests
and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 55
ALB. L. REV. 605, 618 (1992). In other words, a balancing approach is neither liberal
nor conservative; categorical rules are neither liberal nor conservative. Any court's
choice between modes of reasoning must be made on some basis other than result
orientation.
13 There would be less need for case-specific constitutional judgments if police
practices were more often regulated by administrative or statutory rules, as is indeed
the case with most other government functions, such as the discharge or discipline of
public employees and the procedures for exercising eminent domain, to name only
two.
14 Perhaps the best inducement for a state's political representatives, police
chiefs, bar, and bench to write their own rules of search and seizure is the promise
that they may rarely have to read a Fourth Amendment opinion again.
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expressive of that state's own particular constitutional heritage .... -15
I do not make that assertion: I say that a state court's duty is not to
make unique constitutional law, but to make good constitutional law.
State appellate opinions can and do dispose of concrete constitu-
tional disputes justly, no matter what test is used. The justness of par-
ticular resolutions is not the question, but the structure of the rules.
It is a very good question, for example, how a state court ought to
proceed when it "agrees with the Supreme Court's result but rejects
'balancing,' more or less 'fundamental' rights, 'degrees of scrutiny,'
or other Supreme Court clich6s of the times."16 Too often, the liti-
gants will not have briefed the state question in any other terms.17 Yet
state courts are bound to produce, to the extent possible within insti-
tutional constraints, intelligible rules of conduct for future use as well
as proper results in the immediate case. I am acquainted with state
judges who doubt whether much of the federal constitutional rubric
performs this second function well. Improving the coherence and
textual fidelity of state constitutional rulings will not be achieved with-
out work, but it is work that offers a chance of the payoff held out by
the title of this essay: a wealth of state constitutional law that can free
the state judiciary and other state officials from the imposition of na-
tional rules that are made and modified beyond their control.'8
15 Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review
Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 13, 34-35 (1988),
quoted in Shepard, supra note 11, at 432.
16 Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's
Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 929 (1993).
17 Inadequate briefing often forecloses a decision on state grounds, unless the
court takes a more active role:
In many states, a deeply embedded tradition sees the court as an umpire
judging only the arguments presented by counsel, even when neither side
has it right. For an appellate court to introduce a new line of reasoning is
thought unfair to the losing party, to the lawyers, and to a lower court that is
reversed on grounds never presented to it. On their own, judges can intro-
duce new reasons only carefully and without prejudice to the litigants, most
easily when affirming a decision or when its result would be the same under
the older views.
Id. at 933-34; see STATE CONsTn oNAL LAW, supra note 1, at 58-60 (summarizing
rules for preserving and presenting state law claims).
18 This statement is a bit hyperbolic, but only a bit. Fourteenth Amendment
questions will still need to be addressed by state courts whenever state law falls short
of the national minimum requirements, or where no state issue is properly raised, or
where the right asserted is one that is unique to the federal constitution or laws. I am
assuming what the last two decades of state constitutional opinions suggest: that state
guarantees will usually be interpreted to protect the asserted right in a manner
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I begin by suggesting six prerequisites to the development of this
body of law, and discussing briefly why some of these have seemed
problematic to judges, academic critics, and others. As Chief Judge
Judith Kaye of New York has said, a serious idea such as the deliberate
development of state civil liberties is bound to attract criticism.' 9 By
this measure, state constitutional law has arrived, having now gathered
a respectable number of academic detractors20 as well as well-inten-
tioned friends offering "constructive criticism."2' The most skeptical
academics are specialists in federal constitutional law. Backing their
commentary is a drumbeat of belief that a national constitutionalism,
or the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, is the only consti-
tutional rights law worth having or discussing. Some would treat that
Supreme Court as the exclusive legitimate arbiter of all American con-
stitutional rights and liberties questions, a role that the Supreme
Court's members have repeatedly disclaimed.
22
equivalent to or greater than federal counterpart provisions, and that they will rarely
be interpreted to be less protective (though the latter result is logically possible).
19 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice).
20 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "NewJudicial Feder-
alism,"2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 233, 235-38 (1989).
21 The term "constructive criticism" applies literally to such commentators as Paul
Kahn, who likes local diversity but sees state judges as workers in the greater national
enterprise of evolving what is essentially federal constitutionalism. See Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1147 (1993)
[hereinafter Kahn, Interpretation]; see also Paul W. Kahn, Two Communities: Professional
And Political 24 RUTGERS LJ. 957 (1993) [hereinafter Kahn, Two Communities] (re-
sponding to Gardner, supra note 20).
ProfessorJames Gardner's severe and flawed critique of state constitutional deci-
sions, see Gardner, supra note 20, engendered responses ranging from the respectful
to the indignant from a variety ofjudges and constitutional scholars. These responses
are collected in Volume 24, Issue 4 of the Rutgers LawJournal, published in the sum-
mer of 1993. Indiana chief Justice shepard's lucid and intelligent commentary on
Professors Gardner and Kahn appeared recently as well. See Shepard, supra note 11.
22 While I find a nationalist attitude unsurprising in an academic at a national law
school, I don't readily understand the reasons for the same sentiment in the opinions
of state supreme courtjustices. Law students in my State Constitutional Rights Semi-
nar ask me repeatedly why some state justices are loath to decide state constitutional
questions independently, or at all, even when the state issues are dearly distinct, and
have been raised and briefed for the court. I have no single answer for them. Per-
haps the preference for a federal law solution springs from a desire to be a partici-
pant, or "player," in a larger enterprise; or from a natural reluctance to divert
controversy toward state courts, who are much less well defended from public reac-
tion than the Supreme Court; or from a dislike of innovation; or maybe from a con-
fluence of actual agreement with the prevailing philosophy of the Supreme Court
[VOL. 72:41072
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I conclude by offering as candidates for reconsideration some
time-honored but questionable formulas that often appear in the con-
stitutional opinions of state courts. These range from the importation
of phrases like "police power" that may incorrectly imply limits on
state legislative power not found in the state constitution, to formulas
like "reasonable expectation of privacy" that pose as premises for de-
ciding substantive rights. The particular examples chosen do not mat-
ter. They are meant to jostle our thinking about constitutional law a
little, to re-examine familiar but perhaps unworthy conceptual tools.
It is a habit of mind that, if overindulged, may threaten to paralyze us:
but if underindulged, risks freezing us in a middling intellectual land-
scape where the view never changes.
II. Six POSTULATES OF INDEPENDENT METHODOLOGY
I make no claim to originality or completeness in listing the fol-
lowing six postulates, or prerequisites, for reducing dependency on
the federal judiciary in interpreting state law. They are but a starting
point that I am prepared to defend.23 If they provoke questions, they
are probably questions that I ask my students and that an interested
judge should not hesitate to pose to counsel, whether advocating or
opposing an independent construction of state law.
1. Power. State supreme courts have the power to interpret state
law, including constitutional law, in any way they deem sound;24 this
power remains exactly the same even if the United States Supreme
Court has made a contrary ruling, on the same or similar facts, inter-
preting an identical or similar federal right.25
2. Permission. The Supreme Court of the United States has
neither the power nor the desire to nationalize all American constitu-
with ajudicial philosophy that different state texts and history do not play much of a
role in constitutional interpretation.
23 Wholesale rejection of federal doctrine is unnecessary and counter-productive;
it remains one of many sources from which state courts may draw inspiration when
grappling with similar sorts of questions. On reflection, a state court may conclude
that it cannot improve on a particular federal rule and decide to adopt it as state law
in a particular case. The worst mistake a court can make in such cases, in myjudg-
ment, would be to go further and announce that in all future cases, the state provision
will be treated identically with the federal. This "lockstep" practice unnecessarily ties
the state court's hands and confounds lower courts and counsel when the United
States Supreme Court significantly changes its direction in a way that contradicts
standing state precedent.
24 See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) (observing that
federal guarantees of civil rights and liberties may be exceeded by state law).
25 See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection
of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result 35 S.C. L. REv. 353 (1984).
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tional rights to fit one uniform mold; rather, its members, of all ideo-
logical bents, have often invited state courts to consider whether state
law should compel a different analysis or a different outcome.26
3. Polity. The fact that individual rights may differ, depending
only on the happenstance of crossing a state border, is an inevitable
and natural consequence of a federal system, and is no cause for
alarm.
4. Sources. State declarations of individual rights have histories
and qualities that differ, to a greater or lesser degree, from each other
and from the first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution; how-
ever, what really "counts" in state constitutional interpretation is often
not truly unique to one state. Independent interpretation does not
require uniqueness; nor are differences in a state's political or cultural
makeup relevant unless they are differences that demonstrably influ-
enced the making of constitutional choices in an original or amended
document.
5. Semantics. Fresh constitutional theorizing requires scholars,
judges, and lawyers to practice, as a discipline, setting aside federal
jargon, and to question the meaning and the inevitability of catch-
phrases like "fighting words" or "compelling interests" that carry the
comfort and convenience of long use.
6. Systematic Implementation. The full rewards of independence-
among them local control and better guidance to citizens and af-
fected governmental officials-cannot be achieved by ad hoc resort to
state law, but only over time, by a determined and systematic ap-
proach carried out in cooperation by the bar, the bench, the law
schools, and constitutional law scholars.
Virtually no one would disagree with the first two entries on this
list, Power and Permission. Power is a legal truism. Permission is not a
legal prerequisite at all; I list it here only as a reminder that there is
simply no need to see an independent application of state rights as
any kind of statement to the Supreme Court, whether of "defiance,"
26 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) ("Individual States
may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on
police conduct than does the Federal Constitution."); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 428 (1986) ("Nothing we say today disables the States from adopting different
requirements for the conduct of its [sic] employees and officials as a matter of state
law."); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983) ("It is elementary that States
are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system [sic] than the
Federal Constitution requires."); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and
the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 535, 549 (1986) ("[S] tate courts have responded with marvelous enthusiasm to
many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the constitutional gaps left by the decisions of the
Supreme Court majority.").
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disapproval, or "evasion." Yet their awareness of power and permis-
sion caused no little discomfort to state judges in the early years of the
state constitutional rediscovery. Even now, state courts who have no
doubt of their power to disagree with the Supreme Court often do not
wish to use this power after the Supreme Court has already visited the
issue, even if it means backsliding from an earlier pronouncement of
more protective state law.27 Others may use their power only with ex-
treme caution, deliberately embracing a policy of deference toward
federal interpretation.
28
27 Examples of post-certiorari conversion are not rare. On religious establish-
ment or preference, see Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 724 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986)
(backing away from an earlier finding that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case
that a nativity scene violated the state constitution, the court approved the display as
consistent with the intervening federal decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984)); and State v. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995)
(holding that display of Ten Commandments in public park near state capitol build-
ing did not violate the state constitution's ban on granting "preference" to a religion;
Conrad was to be "enlightened" by subsequent Supreme Court First Amendment
decisions).
The degree of protection of free speech afforded by the Ohio and Wisconsin
constitutions was in some doubt after the Supreme Court, disagreeing with the two
state supreme courts, upheld the constitutionality of penalty enhancement for racially
motivated assaults. See State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a law
punishing racial bias in the commission of crime violated both federal and state con-
stitutions), vacated and remanded sub nom., Ohio v. Wyant, 508 U.S. 969 (1993), vacated,
624 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the law violated neither constitution);
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992) (holding that both First Amendment
and Wisconsin rights had been violated), rev'd sub nom., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476 (1993). The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not revive its earlier judgment
for defendant on state grounds. State v. Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d 610 (Wis. 1993).
Counter-examples are also evident. They include that of Michigan, holding that
a sobriety checkpoint program that had passed muster under the Fourth Amendment
nevertheless violated the state's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993), on remand after
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). The Supreme Court of
Minnesota, ruling after the Supreme Court had issued contrary decrees, declined to
conform its free exercise clause to the boundaries of the First Amendment, and struck
down a statute imposing a life sentence for first time drug possession as cruel or unu-
sual under the Minnesota Constitution. See State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282,
(Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom., Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901
(1989), on remand sub nom., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (rein-
stating judgment for religious freedom claimant on state constitutional grounds);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (sustaining Minnesota sentencing statute
against Eighth Amendment attack); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992)
(striking down same statute).
28 A strong variety of this judicial policy might mean advising litigants that the
state court will not depart from federal precedent unless the claimant gives them a
"compelling reason" to do so. A weaker variety instructs litigants that the court will
1075
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The third postulate, which I have called Polity--that diversity of
individual rights is inevitable in our fifty-plus sovereign territories-is
not universally accepted, despite its logic, and despite the drastic and
absurd measures that would be needed to prevent such diversity, if
indeed it is preventable. For several years, I have been teaching a sem-
inar at Loyola Law School called State Constitutional Rights. The
course principally covers individual rights from a comparative and na-
tional perspective, and is the first exposure most students have to state
constitutions. Every year, a few students are initially distressed at the
notion that the exclusionary rule in Idaho might be broader than the
one in Iowa; that conducting political activities in private shopping
malls might be a constitutional right in Massachusetts or NewJersey29
and a criminal trespass in North Carolina.30 When I press them to say
why this diversity makes them uncomfortable, they give answers that
are either conservatively ideological (for example, "the federal floor
creates adequate rights against state government already") or mythical
("constitutional rights are so fundamental that everyone should have
not depart from analogous federal precedent unless some combination of factors is
demonstrated. Requiring attorneys to brief the factors the court considers relevant is
an excellent practice. It is the notion of giving parallel federal precedent any "pre-
sumption" of correctness that should be questioned. The court is free to reach a
decision in line with federal precedent without the aid of any such a priori announce-
ment, and, if it prefers a different result, it may feel forced, again unnecessarily, to
defend its decision to "depart." Phrasing the presumption in reverse, for example,
"We will not follow federal precedent unless you prove to us beyond a doubt that it is
an accurate interpretation of this state's constitution," demonstrates the absurdity of a
lock-step rule.
It is encouraging to see courts soften earlier statements of this kind that unneces-
sarily limited their freedom. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, once stated
that the state's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures should be given a
meaning different from the federal counterpart's "only when there is a compelling
reason to do so." People v. Nash, 341 N.W.2d 439, 446 (Mich. 1983). Ten years later,
that court explained that the quoted language from Nash meant only that "claims that
art. I, § 11 should be interpreted more expansively than the Fourth Amendment must
rest on more than a disagreement with the United States Supreme Court." Sitz v.
Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Mich. 1993). The court was correct
in directing claimants to furnish the court with a principled argument for an in-
dependent interpretation, not just an assertion that the Supreme Court was wrong.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court does not make state law, and disagreement
with the Supreme Court's understanding of a federal provision can quite legitimately
spur a state court to consider the state provision differently.
29 See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); New
Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757
(N.J. 1994).
30 See State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1981); see alsoJacobs v. Major, 407
N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987) (upholding a tortious trespass for political activity at a mall).
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the same ones"). I suspect that members of the latter group are some-
times expressing a vague nostalgia for the Warren Court era, an era
that first impressed upon them, through college courses and heroic
motion pictures, the majesty of federal courts enforcing ever-ex-
panding constitutional rights on behalf of the underdog. The ideo-
logical answer is, at least, one that could ethically be advanced in
court on behalf of a government client. The mythical or nostalgic
answer could not be squared with ethical obligations, if it blinded a
lawyer to a plausible state constitutional argument that supported her
client's case but proposed to "exceed" federal precedent.
• Of course, other students are believers from the first day of class,
and cannot wait to start making new constitutional law. Most of these
are motivated by ideology too, a rights-expanding ideology-after all,
they are preparing themselves to be advocates, not judges, and stu-
dents in civil rights classes commonly identify with the perceived un-
derdog. Finally, others-a handful-exhibit a touching hope that in
my class they will learn something about constitutional reasoning that
does not hide behind the Oz-like curtain of interest balancing and
intermediate scrutiny. I hope that I do not fail them. Perhaps law
students have always hidden their insecurities behind tough assertions
such as "judges do whatever they want and make up the reasons later"
(they hold the same high regard for professors' grading habits), but I
fear that much federal constitutional rights "discourse" only en-
trenches their cynicism, and leaves them unpracticed and even resis-
tant to arguments based on text, craft, history, or logic.
When I read academic articles complaining that "state constitu-
tionalism" is producing a diversity of rights that is undesirable and
practically un-American, 3' I cannot help but think of my students.
Two writers holding this view are ProfessorJames Gardner and Profes-
sorJames Diehm. Professor Gardner's 1992 broadside at state consti-
tutionalism in the Michigan Law Review dismissed the decisions of state
supreme courts as impoverished, unintelligible, and destructive of na-
tional unity.3 2 Professor Diehm, a law professor and former federal
prosecutor, has attacked the modern diversity of constitutional rights
on the ground of unfairness.33 He recalls the trade in illegally seized
evidence, a practice known as the Silver Platter, that flourished before
31 See Gardner, supra note 20, at 824 ("The existence in our system of state consti-
tutions is in tension with the premises of national constitutionalism and may even
pose a genuine threat to it.").
32 Gardner, supra note 20 (describing state constitutional law as a "danger" or
"threat" to the nation at least sixteen times).
33 James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We
Repeating the Mistakes of the PastW, 55 Mn. L. Rxv. 223 (1996).
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Mapp v. Ohio34 standardized the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule. State courts that now impose higher-than-fed-
eral limits on law enforcement practices are, he argues, creating
unacceptable inequities among similarly situated defendants, and con-
founding the state and federal officers who must now operate and
cooperate under non-uniform rules.35
Although I find something to agree with in the comments of each
of these two commentators, each fundamentally misses the mark. Pro-
fessor Gardner, for example, besides ignoring the innovative and
highly intelligible work of several fine courts, scores points off a
strawman. The strawman is a false premise that he says defines state
constitutionalism. He writes: "The central premise of state constitu-
tionalism is that a state constitution reflects the fundamental values,
and ultimately the character, of the people of the state that adopted
it."36 This statement is inspirational, but in the way that political
speeches are meant to be. As a statement of theory, or law, or even of
a central premise of anything but Gardner's own preferences,3 7 I can-
not agree with it. The independence of state constitutional decisions
rests, more modestly but no less importantly, on the dispersal of
power inherent in a national plan that retains, as to matters not dele-
gated, the sovereignty of each state. State courts that exercise this
power, when they interpret and apply the state's own organic law,
need neither to apologize to any other court, nor to claim for them-
selves the rather daunting role of dispensing, along with judicial deci-
sions, the "fundamental values and character" of the state's citizens,
the majority of whom are unaware of and little affected by 'constitu-
tional opinions. But no state court can decline to exercise this power,
once presented with a genuine state constitutional claim on which
hinges the outcome of a live dispute.3 8
Separate sovereignties may and often do produce outcomes and
approaches diverse from the national answer and from one another.
They are also entitled to copy one another, if satisfied of the sound-
34 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35 Diehm, supra note 33, at 250-59.
36 Gardner, supra note 20, at 764.
37 "Gardner .... is a nationalist. He does not want to see an independent state
constitutional law because it will interfere with his hierarchical conception of Ameri-
can nationalism." Daniel J. Elazar, A Response to Professor Gardner's The Failed Dis-
course of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 975, 982 (1993).
38 "[Interpretation is more than academic theory, it is a daily practical task. The-
ory requires more than having an opinion whether state courts should postulate sepa-
rate state and national values; it must be tested against real questions." Linde, supra
note 16, at 929.
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ness of another court's reasoning. But Gardner and others make the
claim that national uniformity is logically, and perhaps even norma-
tively required. Conformity is not the highest value to be achieved in
constitutional law, nor is it demanded by the structure of our nation's
government.39
State judges, I believe, would do well to avoid singling out state
constitutions as the embodiment of state citizens' "fundamental" val-
ues or their unique character. Their charge-difficult enough-is to
arrive at a means of sound interpretation and application that is re-
sponsible to the document they are examining, however they see that
responsibility. Constitutional pronouncements need not, to inspire
respect and admiration, be phrased as revelations of universal truth:
as Gardner says, this posture places a court in the odd position of
inadvertently suggesting that otherjurisdictions that get along without
the rights just held to be "fundamental" might be a bit antediluvian. 40
Each constitution certainly reflects the high aspirations that its
drafters and ratifiers held concerning the proper goals of good gov-
39 Congress must guarantee to each state a republican form of government, U.S.
CONsr. art. IV, § 4, and the Supreme Court must outlaw challenged state rules, in-
cluding constitutional ones, that fall below national norms, U.S. CONSr. art. VI. But
beyond enforcing these minimum requirements, neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court purports to have the power forcibly to standardize state and federal constitu-
tional law. Given the political impossibility of a mass revision of state charters, which
Gardner concedes, he and fellow critics of diversity must therefore be urging state
courts to abandon their own law wholesale, a choice no state court can logically or
ethically make.
40 If one were to accept his inflated definition of constitutionalism, Gardner's
objections would carry some weight. For example, he says that differences in rights
would then be incoherent and disparaging of the choices of other jurisdictions:
[W]hen a state constitution conflicts with the national Constitution, we can
only conclude that the people of that state consider certain values funda-
mental for themselves, but not for the rest of us.
Even on the most basic level, this type of divergence can be unsettling.
If a value is good enough to be fundamental to the people of the state, one
might say, why isn't it good enough for everybody? There is something
vaguely selfish and hostile about the people of a state going off to their own
comer and making up rules for their own self-governance that they think
superior to the ones the rest of the country has decided to use. And even
were this not the case, it is difficult to accept the idea that fundamental
values on which all Americans agree can really differ significantly from place
to place....
... Such an inference embraces another contradiction: how can the
same person simultaneously have both types of character? Constitutionalism
itself rejects such a possibility-if a constitution reflects the character of a
people then it cannot simultaneously reflect the opposite of their character.
Gardner, supra note 20, at 824-25.
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emiment, the demands that relinquished power be exercised in a cer-
tain way, and the limits on governmental power that they thought wise
in order to safeguard their liberty (mostly meaning government non-
interference) to realize individual or community values. A constitu-
tion certainly expresses deeply held values, but not necessarily the
most important values, nor the character, of any group of people liv-
ing at a particular moment in time within a particular set of bounda-
ries, state or national. If we are sincere about locating the places in
our legal system from which our deepest values emerge, I would sug-
gest we are more likely to find them in common law decisions, or in
such statutes as those that govern marriage and divorce, who shall pay
taxes and how much, and how our schools are run. And outside the
law are even deeper and more personal shared values: responsibility,
neighborliness, charity, filial respect, and respect for the miracle of
nature.
Professor Gardner is not the first to find differences in rights un-
settling-as I mentioned earlier, my students also do for the first week
or two of the seminar. But Gardner's anxiety has no cure. The na-
tional Constitution is not a document of totalitarianism, either of val-
ues, or of character, or of individual rights. And conformity, as he
concedes, is not practical. State judges whose own analysis and prece-
dents direct them to apply similar texts in ways modestly different
from the way five of nine federal appointees see it-for none of the
state variations yet adds up to any radical statement of symbolic seces-
sion-are neither amateurs nor heretics. To choose just one exam-
ple, twenty or so states have by decision or statute declined to adopt
the "good faith exception" to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule that would admit evidence seized under the authority of an inva-
lid search warrant, so long as the executing officer believed in good
faith that the warrant was valid.41 On what conceivable ethical
grounds could these courts and legislatures allow their considered
judgment to be overridden by an abstract goal of national uniform-
ity-even if they assigned some value to uniformity?
The other critic to condemn diversity, Professor Diehm, inveighs
sternly against the fact that state and federal law enforcement cooper-
41 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 631-33 (listing states).
Traditional courts are probably right to be wary of embracing an exception
which, by logical extension, could swallow the entire exclusionary rule except in prov-
able instances of deliberate police misconduct. In fact, the exception is already being
expanded. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (admitting evidence of search of
car, though warrant to arrest motorist had earlier been quashed but erroneously not
removed from police computers).
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ation is complicated when constitutional rights differ by state and dif-
fer from federal standards.42 (Of course, diverse state statutes
regulating searches, which he also deplores, are equally complicat-
ing.) It is undeniable, as he writes, that disparities in treatment occur
as a result. Here is but one illustration. Suppose that both state and
federal law enforcement agents are involved in capturing two defend-
ants, Mr. A and Ms. B, who are accused of a crime prosecutable in
either state or federal court, at the discretion of the prosecutors. A is
tried in state court, where an exclusionary rule stricter than the
Fourth Amendment's excludes the evidence seized by a state agent.
The same evidence is then lawfully admitted by a federal court against
B, A's accomplice. As a result, one defendant is acquitted and the
other convicted, based solely on the uniform of the searching officer
and the court that tries the case. This, Professor Diehm argues, is
unfair: he believes two convictions would be more just than one, for
he argues against the creation of separate state rights that result in
different outcomes. But, once again, this is a normal incident of sepa-
rate sovereignties, here dramatized by concurrent jurisdiction. And
the author's proposed "solution" is as extreme and misplaced as his
alarm. He concludes:
If the problems created by the disparities in constitutional princi-
ples again reach a critical level, even more drastic measures may
ensue. The United States Supreme Court could possibly abrogate
or modify the "adequate state grounds rule" and hold that federal
and state constitutional standards must be the same. It is even possi-
ble that Congress could enact federal legislation requiring a unified
approach to constitutional criminal procedure. 43
Maybe so, but I fear another Revolution would have to precede such a
change, one that would severely modify federalism as we know it or do
away with the states altogether, except as administrative units for the
central authority. That might be the ultimate goal of the cultural and
legal nationalists, but it is not the law.
The fourth postulate listed-Sources-deliberately evokes what
has been called the "Doctrine of Unique State Sources." This, too,
remains a point of disagreement between courts and critics. Professor
Paul Kahn,44 calling himself friendly to a vigorous state constitutional-
42 Diehm, supra note 33.
43 Diehm, supra note 33, at 262-63 (footnotes omitted). The three omitted notes
refer to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and other commentators who are said
to suggest the Supreme Court or Congress could impose uniform national standards
governing state and federal police investigations.
44 Kahn, Interpretation, supra note 21; see also Kahn, Two Communities, supra note 21
(responding to Gardner, supra note 20).
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ism, nevertheless asks state judges to soft-pedal reliance on any state
source, including apparently the actual text and drafting history of the
document, in favor of more generic reasoning that will qualify them as
partners in the national enterprise of what he calls "American Consti-
tutionaism."45 This advice, I think, will not be accepted by most state
judges, nor should it be. On the other hand, Professor Kahn has a
point if, as he says, state judges believe that only the existence of
"unique" state texts or histories can justify interpreting constitutional
language differently and independently.46
The disagreement between courts and critics would vanish if ex-
ponents of each end of the spectrum on this issue would accept a
common sense middle ground definition of what state sources,
whether unique or not, "count" as premises for modem constitutional
theories or applications. A legitimate source of state pride can be the
political and cultural attributes of the state's present population or
even of its earliest settlers. Unless these attributes can clearly be
linked to constitutional choices made by the latest effective drafters,
they do not easily fumish plausible sources of contemporary interpre-
tation. State populations change, and change profoundly over time.
Immigrants arrive, old ways die out, new priorities arise. People gov-
emed by today's decisions do not bear much necessary relation to
those who yielded their sovereign power to a state government origi-
nally. States do have and retain genuine cultural differences, despite
the tidal wave of conformity imposed on us, mostly by national purvey-
ors of entertainment and consumerism. But I imagine it would be a
relatively rare occurrence where soft evidence of this kind would give
a judge enough of a handhold to draw an otherwise difficult line be-
tween two plausible outcomes. Without question, however, a state's
text, drafting and adoption history, and precedent, whether unique or
not, remain relevant. Most challenging is the modern judge's task of
discerning there the larger principles that support modern applica-
45 Kahn states that if he were a state judge he would:
abandon the central premise of most previous works, namely, that the inter-
pretation of a state constitution must rely on unique state sources of law.
Those sources include the text of the state constitution, the history of its
adoption and application, and the unique, historically identifiable qualities
of the state community.
Kahn, Interpretation, supra note 21, at 1147.
46 "State constitutional law, it is assumed, can diverge from federal law only if the
differences can be traced to one of these sources." Id.
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tions undreamed of by distant writers.47 But these "hard" sources usu-
ally leave a great deal of room to move as well: a variety of choices may
be equally in keeping with them. Differences in state constitutional
decisions, like differences in common law tort decisions, usually have
much more to do, I suspect, with the individual philosophies and ex-
periences of members of the bench and bar, with the vehicles
presented to the courts, with the political climate of the state, with
degrees of ideological agreement or disagreement with the Supreme
Court, and with-for want of a better word-the court's inclination
toward leadership or followership.48
To illustrate, few states can be said to have a truly "unique" search
and seizure clause 4 9-after all, the common history of the states, the
47 I know of no metaphor that better captures a judge's need to seek diligently
for plausible modem applications while remaining true to historical principles than
this one:
Constitutional text is important not for what a court must decide but for
what it cannot plausibly decide.... A long buried grub surprisingly meta-
morphoses into a butterfly and remains the same insect, and an underwater
tadpole turns into an airbreathing frog; but some decisions have made but-
terflies grow from tadpoles, to the applause of theorists who prefer
butterflies.
Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165,
196 (1984).
48 Fifth Circuit Court of AppealsJudgeJames Dennis, then ajustice on the Loui-
siana Supreme Court, once said, deploring his colleagues' reluctance to stand on
their own ground:
In reality, my colleagues have sunk this court to the lowest pitch of abject
followership. They no longer believe in our state constitution as an act of
fundamental self-government by the people of Louisiana. They no longer
perceive this court to be the final arbiter of the meaning of that constitution,
bound by the intent of the drafters and ratifiers as reflected by the text, the
drafting history, and this court's constitutional precedents. Instead, for
them, our state constitution is a blank parchment fit only as a copybook in
which to record the lessons on the history of the Common Law that flow
from Justice Scalia's pen.
State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 719 (La. 1993) (Dennis, J., dissenting), quoted in Lisa
D. Munyon, Comment, "It's a Sonry Frog Who Won't Holler in His Own Pond: The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court's Response to the Challenges of New Federalism, 42 Loy. L. REv. 313, 313
(1996). The author also attributes to a delegate to the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional
Convention the following observation, which probably says it all, as far as this Essay is
concerned: "I'm against the federal government trying to bring Louisiana kicking and
screaming into the 20th century. Why can't we lead the way some time?" Id.
49 There are some variants of the familiar formula. Both the Washington and
Arizona Constitutions provide: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law." ARiz. CONsT. art. II, § 8; WASH. CONSr.
art. I, § 7. Amendments have also introduced some variety by expressing contempo-
rary concerns. See, e.g., LA. CoNsr. art. I, § 5 (adding right against "invasions of pri-
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United States, and England yielded the wording of this common re-
straint of government. But divergence from another court's prior re-
sult requires no separate justification, not even if that prior court is a
highly respected national one. The Supreme Court's prior visitation
of a Fourth Amendment issue carries no guarantee of infallibility: in
constitutional interpretation, first in time is not first in right. As has
been said before by abler scholars-the question whether to give
"more" or "less" than, or to interpret differently from the Supreme
Court detains us far too much. At bottom, it is not the right question.
The right question it what the state provision says, what it means, and
how it applies to the case at hand.50 We cannot avoid these questions
indefinitely.
I find myself most in agreement with the comments of Justice
Denise Johnson of the Vermont Supreme Court, who states that a
state text or other materials can sometimes guide the answer, but that,
at the same time, "we do not need a unique state source to justify our
differences with the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. The
concept of sovereignty gives state courts the right and the justification
to disagree."51 It is enough to discern and apply the values that docu-
ment apparently meant to perpetuate. It is not necessary, in order to
support pursuit of independent or diverse state doctrines, to assert
that every state constitutional decision reflects a unique political cli-
mate or set of values.
The fifth and sixth postulates on my short list-Semantics and Sys-
tem-ask for a change of ingrained habits of mind and habits of pro-
fessionalism, in the interest of creating an intellectual space where
participants have the permission and the inducement to engage in
freedom of thought. Pretend that there are no federal constitutional
opinions.52 Or if that is too much, discard any lingering presumption
vacy" as well as broad standing to challenge illegality of search); N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 12 (including bans on interception of electronic communications).
50 Linde, supra note 47, at 179.
51 PROTECTING INDIIDUAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM, RE-
PORT OF THE 1992 FORUM OF STATE COURT JUDGES 43 (Barbara Wolfson ed., 1993).
52 Courts and attorneys interpreting the new United States Constitution, and
each new amendment to it, needed to make arguments without the aid of much
caselaw. Have modern attorneys lost that skill? Professor Gardner complains that
state constitutional law is in bad shape partly because precedent is too thin for lawyers
to make decent arguments. Gardner, supra note 20, at 804-05. Professor Daniel
Elazar responds:
[W]hat if Gardner were right? Would that mean it would be impossible to
develop the information, analysis and arguments needed? What ifJohn Mar-
shall would have said something similar about the Constitution in 1800?
Gardner, alas, reveals himself as no innovator. That, too, is more a reflec-
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of correctness of federal doctrine for all cases, not just for some.
Guides to the sort of briefing the court demands are essential; but,
sometimes lists of "factors" a court announces simply deform the in-
quiry: the rights claimant should not be required to use these factors
to persuade the court first that the federal standard is wrong, before
getting to what the state law means.
There are real obstacles to innovation: the defaults of lawyers, the
philosophical disagreements among justices, the costs to clients of de-
vising new theories, the pressure to reduce the backlog, and other
institutional pressures. They are not insurmountable, as experience
has shown. Practical guides to stimulating a reinvigoration of state
constitutional arguments and decisions have been published by two
Oregon Justices.53 I recommend them to my students and to all inter-
tion on his failure to investigate state constitutions fully than on the virtues
or weaknesses of state constitutional law.
Elazar, supra note 37, at 978-79.
53 See Wallace P. Carson, Jr., "Last Things Last": A Methodological Approach to Legal
Arguments in State Courts, 19 WrTI~mrE L. REv. 641 (1983) (suggesting a five point
methodology to lawyers preparing to argue constitutional questions in state court);
Linde, supra note 16, at 933 (suggesting a twelve step program for the cooperation of
judges and attorneys in achieving "an independent jurisprudence freed from generic
boilerplate"). To paraphrase the twelve elements briefly, judges can regularly.
(1) Decide the issue, if possible, on subconstitutional grounds, such as
lack of legal authority or principles of equity.
(2) Announce that it will hear, and then decide state constitutional
claims before federal constitutional claims in challenges to state or local
laws.
(3) Ask the parties for additional memoranda when a state issue is
raised, but not independently briefed.
(4) Note in an opinion the nature of any state constitutional issue not
decided.
(5) Remind counsel that independent state jurisprudence does not re-
quire a state court to disagree about the meaning of parallel state and fed-
eral clauses in order to apply a state clause differently from federal decisions.
(6) Begin the court's opinion by analyzing the state's law, not with fed-
eral doctrines and whether to depart from them.
Lawyers can, without waiting for judges to take these steps:
(7) Raise state issues at the first opportunity.
(8) Separate state issues from federal issues in all arguments. When a
Supreme Court holding will not permit a federal claim, present one based
only on the state constitution.
(9) Always quote the state constitutional provisions, but unless any dis-
tinct wording is known to have been purposeful, stress that identical or dif-
ferent wording is unimportant for independent state interpretation.
(10) Begin by briefing state law, not by briefing federal cases and termi-
nology, and arguing simply that the state court should strike a different bal-
ance in your favor.
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ested judges and lawyers. The law schools could do much more to
help. Most state justices are able to cultivate professional relationships
with constitutional professors from schools in their states. In appro-
priate cases, these professors might be asked to author amicus curiae
briefs addressed to state constitutional questions raised but unan-
swered by the litigants. Professors should also be willing to aid the
state and local bar associations by conducting Continuing Legal Edu-
cation courses in the substance and methodology of state constitu-
tional law.
III. THE QUALITY QUESTION
If writers have sometimes questioned the quality of analysis in
state constitutional opinions, it is not entirely without reason. One
generation of renewed activity in interpreting underused language is
hardly enough time to achieve uniform excellence in an enterprise
this challenging. Successful innovations in basic theory are the most
difficult, requiring time, a willing bar, a receptive bench, and the avail-
ability of cases that present good vehicles for examining old assump-
tions. But better analysis does not always require major, or even
much, innovation in theory. Constitutional opinions, both federal
and state, could benefit from the quiet elimination of pockets of out-
dated or illogical boilerplate that are often unnecessary to the sub-
stance of the opinions. I conclude by suggesting two candidates for
elimination, and two for innovation.
A. 'Police Power". Is There Such an Animal?
Is it possible, in your state, for the judiciary to invalidate an act of
the legislature, on the sole ground that the statute exceeds the legisla-
ture's "police power"? If not, does "police power" nevertheless appear
in published opinions as a descriptive term for a power that the legis-
lature possesses? In either case, why? The explanation is important
because it concerns the vital question of the scope of legislative power
and corresponding scope of judicial review.
According to the most common understanding, a state constitu-
tion distributes plenary power to the legislative branch-unlike the
(11) Rely on the state courts' broader statutory and constitutional
sources (common examples are regulation of elections, education, or judi-
cial remedies) rather than all-purpose federal doctrine.
(12) Offer the court ways of discarding an old precedent without over-
ruling it, for example, by checking whether an independent state claim was
raised or briefed to the court and whether a better analysis can be made.
Id. at 934-36 (footnotes omitted).
1o86 [VOL.- 72:4
1997] STATE COURTS AS SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
federal Constitution, it does not grant enumerated powers. A chal-
lenge to a federal statute as falling beyond the power of Congress to
enact it requires analysis of the enumerated power that purportedly
supports the legislation. The typical state charter, which appears to
vest the full legislative power in the legislative branch, eliminates the
need, in challenges to state statutes, to examine and interpret a grant
of a particular power. Clearly, then, we cannot talk about a state's
"police power" in the same way that we refer to Congress' power over,
say, interstate commerce. Limits on plenary state legislative power are
expressed elsewhere in the constitution (for example, in the Declara-
tion of Rights or other prohibitions on government) or are structural
(that is, limits necessarily implied in order to maintain separation of
powers). Therefore, unless the state constitution uses the term police
power to describe legislative power or some fraction of it, the practi-
cally ubiquitous presence of this concept in state opinions needs
explanation.54
A "police regulation" is commonly described as one that affects
public safety, welfare, health or morals, or the like.5 5 Sometimes it is
added that the law must be "rational," in the sense of being reasonably
effective in achieving these goals.56 The implication is that when a
54 The definition and precise scope of "police power" has never been dear. Most
of the time, the term does not appear in the constitution, but is descended from
generations ofjudicial opinions. Sometimes the state constitution refers explicitly to
the "police power" as including some, usually specialized, aspect of legislative power.
NewJersey furnishes one example in a 1928 constitutional amendment declaring that
a legislative delegation to local governments of authority to adopt land use regula-
tions "shall be deemed to be within the police power of the state." NJ. CONsT. art. IV,
§ 6, 1 2. I address my questions here to uses of the "police power" concept without a
textual basis for it.
55 Examples could be drawn from almost any state, in almost any year. See, e.g.,
State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C. 1949) ("legislature may enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to protect or promote the heath, morals, order, safety, and gen-
eral welfare of society"); Mattei v. Hecke, 279 P. 470, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929)
("'[T]he due exercise of the police power is limited to the preservation of the public
health, safety, and morals, and that legislation which transcends these objects,
whatever other justification it may claim for its existence, cannot be upheld as a legiti-
mate police regulation.'" (quoting Ex parte Dickey, 77 P. 924, 925 (1904))) (striking
down statute requiring vendor to label non-standard fruit containers as "irregular
container"); Ex parte Hayden, 82 P. 315 (Cal. 1905) ("Legislature, under the guise of
police regulation, cannot enact laws which do not pertain to [public welfare, health
or morals] and which impose onerous and unnecessary burdens upon business and
property.") (striking down law requiring county of origin to be stamped on packages
of fruit for sale, as invalid invasion of personal liberty).
56 Ballance, 51 S.E.2d at 735.
If a statute is to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power, it
must have a rational, real, or substantial relation to the public health,
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statute exceed the imits of "police power," it is unconstitutional and
may be invalidated, even if the law transgresses no other limit on what
the legislature is allowed to do. 57 The result appears to be an ex-
traordinary extension of power to thejudiciary. Even if in a particular
state the concept has no "bite," but simply appears routinely in the
court's opinions as a synonym for plenary legislative power, it is not
harmless. In both cases, "police power" implies something that is not
self-evident. A state legislature ordinarily can enact any law not for-
bidden by state or federal constitutional provisions-presumably its
members do so precisely because a majority believes the law will en-
hance the welfare, safety, or health of their constituents. Legislators
routinely explain their actions to the press and the voters in such
terms. However, the majority can misjudge in which direction public
welfare lies, and still produce a law that is constitutional, however un-
wise and unpopular. The executive branch may have a veto power
over such a law; voters retain the ultimate veto power, whether via the
initiative process or by electing smarter representatives. But from
where would the judicial branch receive the power to strike down
such a law?
A little historic detective work easily uncovers how "police power"
may have entered state court decisions, where it cane to mean a sub-
morals, orders, or safety, or the general welfare. In brief, it must be reason-
ably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a public good or to pre-
vent the infliction of a public harm.
Id.; cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498, 504 (N.C. 1976).
[T]he legislative power .... is subject to the general limitation thereof that
the interference with individual liberty, or with the right of an owner of
property to use it as he sees fit, must have a reasonable relation to the ac-
complishment of the legislative purpose and must not be unreasonable in
degree, in comparison with the probable public benefit.
Id.; ef. People ex reL Duryea v. Wilber, 90 N.E. 1140, 1143 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1910) (strik-
ing down law making it an offense to operate a public dancing academy without
proper license as a "discrimination" without a substantial factual basis, and therefore
exceeding police power).
57 In contract, some states do tie the police power limit directly to the constitu-
tion, creating a different vision of the proper scope of legislative power than the
"usual understanding." In Ballance, the North Carolina Supreme Court voided a stat-
ute making it an offense to practice photography without a license, as exceeding the
police power of the legislature and therefore intruding upon the liberty that, according
to N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17, may not be infringed but by "the law of the land." Ballance
51 S.E.2d at 734. The court has linked its decision to the constitutional text, with the
scope of "police power" serving as a way to define what is and what is not a bona fide
"law of the land." The result is a sort of "substantive due process" review of economic
and social legislation of the type formerly practiced by the United States Supreme
Court, before its abandonment in the 1930s.
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stantive limit on plenary legislative power. It originated, however, in a
different context, for a different purpose. In the early part of the 19th
century, it was an open question how much a state could regulate ac-
tivities that could otherwise be characterized as "interstate commerce"
and therefore perhaps subject to the exclusive authority of Congress.
The earliest Supreme Court decisions to address this issue needed to
remove state imposed obstacles to trade across state lines, but did not
wish to deny states all ability to regulate the effects of these commer-
cial activities on their citizens. A line was needed to demarcate state
legislative power at the edge of the Commerce Clause. The line was
drawn, by justice Marshall and his successors, according to the appar-
ent purpose of the challenged state law. If its purpose was to safe-
guard citizens' health, safety, and Welfare, and the like, it was not a
forbidden "regulation of commerce" but rather a proper exercise of
the state's "police power" to protect its inhabitants from harm.58
In this context, the term was a useful shorthand for indicating the
boundaries on state plenary power imposed by the Commerce Clause.
Years later, the concept assumed a similar function in Supreme Court
opinions like Lochner v. New York,59 in which the issue was now
whether a state law had intruded into a zone of liberty implicitly pro-
tected by the Federal Fourteenth Amendment. But however dis-
torted, "police power" was still used to demarcate a line between state
legislative power and the prohibitions of the Federal Constitution. It
was not meant to announce an implied, all-purpose limit on state leg-
islative power-and of course the Supreme Court would have had no
power to impose such a limit, were a supreme federal law not
concerned.
Meanwhile, "police power" began, like a non-native species, to
creep into state court decisions, where it was used to challenge unwel-
come laws in cases where no potential clash with superior federal law
was involved, on the ground that they did not in fact promote the
health or welfare of the populace.60 In this usage, it simply en-
58 E.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 386 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Gibbons v.
Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see also FELiX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WArTE 27-31 (1937).
59 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding that state law limiting working hours for bakers
involved neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public and was not
necessary or appropriate as a health law; holding that law was an invalid exercise of
the state's police power, and violated the baker's Fourteenth Amendment guarantee
of individual liberty to contract for his labor on other terms).
60 In the mid-eighteenth century Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts was likely
the first American state judge to speak of legislative "police power," spelling out the
"ends" test only intimated by Justice Marshall's early decisions. See Norris v. Boston,
45 Mass. (4 Met.) 282, 292-93 (1842) (in distinguishing whether a state has the corn-
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couraged the courts to second guess the wisdom or utility of duly
passed statutes, though no written constitutional constraint required
the legislature to be either wise or utilitarian. Protecting public
health, welfare, and safety may be a good narrative description of the
goals of lawmakers, but a poor test for the legality of their acts.
In sum, the question for courts that use the "police power"
formula is whether it serves any valid purpose. If a state legislature
possesses true plenary power, not power to make law in limited subject
areas the phrase is misleading. It is superfluous if used only to refer to
plenary legislative power. In any use, it cannot help but suggest to
potential litigants that there are subject areas in which the legislature
may not legislate-areas outside the "police power"-although the
boundary of this forbidden terrain is not usually drawn from any text
or articulated theory of government. This suggestion leads inevitably
to litigation asking courts to strike down unpopular legislation as ex-
ceeding the police power, thus proposing a dubious and undemo-
cratic premise for judicial review and rejection of laws. In short,
unless its use is further explained, this is a concept that deserves an
immediate interment in state legislative power cases. Without specific
rejection by a state court it will continue to pepper appellate briefs
and student exams whenever an advocate is seeking a way around the
law.
B. The Presumption of Constitutionality
The oft-quoted presumption that statutes and ordinances are
constitutional is a misnomer that is unnecessary to the court's pur-
pose. 61 It can be omitted from constitutional opinions without effect
on appropriate burdens of persuasion or results.
petence to pass any state law, "we look rather to the ends to be attained, than to the
particular enactments by which they are to be reached"); see also Bruce Kempkes, The
Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too Tight, 42 DRAKE L.
REV. 593, 598 n.19 (1993).
61 See, e.g., Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Wis. 1996) ("We start
with the presumption that the ordinances are constitutional and that, in order to
prevail, [plaintiff] must demonstrate otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt."); Califor-
nia Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 583 P.2d 729, 731 (Cal. 1978) ("strong" presump-
tion supports legislative acts). Courts sometimes modify or reject the presumption
when it appears that the law invades civil liberties. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64
n.28 (Haw. 1993) ("The presumption of statutory constitutionality... does not apply
to laws, which, on their face, classify on the basis of suspect categories."), on remand
sub. nom, Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
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A presumption, in precise and ordinary usage, is a legislative or
court made rule, or statute, that is concerned with matters of evi-
dence-matters of fact, not of law. Presumptions are meant to solve
problems of missing evidence, such as the presumption of death after
a seven year absence; to shift the burden to the party most likely to be
in possession of relevant evidence (such as the presumption con-
tained in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); or to effect substantive
policy by favoring one outcome despite available evidence (for exam-
ple, a conclusive presumption that a husband is the father of any child
conceived during the marriage). Other, looser uses of presumptions
serve policy ends by encouraging conditions necessary for an impartial
decision-for example, the presumption of innocence accorded to
the criminally accused. All these examples address matters capable of
proof or disproof, by evidence.
In strict usage, then, one cannot presume that a law is constitu-
tional. Presumptions cannot decide matters of law, and whether a
given law is in within the state's power to make is a question of law,
though often decided by judges in connection with a factual record of
its passage or its operation. Thus, a true presumption of constitution-
ality is logically impossible in most contexts in which it appears.
Functionally, the maxim is probably not meant literally, but figur-
atively. It is a serious way of signifying to litigants something like the
following: "The court will not take a constitutional challenge lightly.
Those who make such claims bear the burden of persuading us by
adequate legal research and argument that lawmakers (who should be
assumed to desire to be law-abiding) have transgressed the limits of
their authority."62 Rephrasing to eliminate the word presumption
would not lessen a challenger's burden nor change any outcome. It
would, however constitute a small but welcome advance in the
straightforward quality of a court's reasoning.
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments .... .").
62 Thus, as the presumption is explained by the California Supreme Court, it is
actually an expression of deference to an expert legislative judgment:
[W]hen the Legislature has enacted a statute with the relevant constitutional
prescriptions in mind.... [T]he statute represents a considered legislative
judgment as to the appropriate reach of the constitutional provision.
Although the ultimate constitutional interpretation must rest, of course,
with thejudiciary, a focused legislative judgment on the question enjoys sig-
nificant weight and deference by the courts.
Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Cal. 1981) (citations omitted).
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C. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Search and Seizure Cases
The "reasonable expectation of privacy"6 3 has been justly criti-
cized as an unduly vague standard, one that lends itself to the judicial
creation of myriad fact-specific exceptions in order to avoid excluding
valuable evidence of guilt from a criminal prosecution. 64 The ulti-
mate product of thirty years of this case-by-case rulemaking is an illogi-
cal and unwieldy body of Fourth Amendment doctrine. I am troubled
by this formulation as constitutional law, less for its use of the word
"reasonable," with the looseness this and similar classes of words per-
mit,65 than for its upside-down focus on the expectations of the citi-
zen, rather than on the conduct of the government agent (or
searcher). Unlike most other rights guarantees, the text of the typical
provision on search and seizure, by prohibiting "unreasonable" ac-
tions (setting aside for the moment the proper scope of the warrant
clause) invites flexibility in application over changing factual patterns
and over time. But the prohibition, like most others, is nevertheless
directed specifically to government agents: it is improper searches
that are forbidden, not foolish expectations. Reorienting the test
would not by itself answer the question whether a particular type, or
instance, of government scrutiny was excessive, or required a prior
warrant, but it would at least place the focus where it belongs. 66
By contrast, making the starting point of analysis the privacy the
citizen expected, or should have expected, leads to outcomes that
challenge common sense. Logically, our expectations of receiving
63 Justice Harlan introduced the "reasonable expectation of privacy" as a reason
to invalidate a search under the Fourth Amendment in his concurring opinion in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). It later became the majority standard.
64 See David Schuman, Communitarian Search and Seizure, 27 AM. CarM. L. REv. 583,
591-93 (1990).
65 The process that is "due" when the government takes life, liberty, or property
falls into a similar class of terms lacking readily objective standards, as do bans on
"unnecessary" rigor in the treatment of prisoners, for example, IND. CONsT. art. I,
§ 15, and requirements that "all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the
offense," for example, IND. CONST. art. I, § 16. Still, to make them workable on other
than an ad hoc basis, courts are meant to confine these sorts of terms by more defi-
nite principles.
66 Some courts have expressed doubts, or simply rejected the test. See, e.g., State
v. Wallace, 910 P.2d 695 (Haw. 1996) (holding that a search occurs when there is an
exploration for an item or when that item is hidden); Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536,
540 (Ind. 1994) ("[w]e are not persuaded that [the expectation of privacy test]
should be used when applying the state reasonableness standard under Article I,
§ 11"); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Or. 1988) (finding that a search is any
activity which, "if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the government, will signifi-
cantly impair [citizens'] freedom from scrutiny").
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anything diminish to the degree that we have given it up, or have been
regularly deprived of it. No American court would approve of the per-
vasive government surveillance imagined by George Orwell in his
novel 1984,67 though his characters clearly, and very reasonably, ex-
pected'no privacy at all. Is our reaction that "they had a right to more
than they expected?" If so, then the definition of a search should be
reformulated to protect not the privacy one expects-but the privacy
to which one has a right. In Supreme Court opinions, a recurring
justification for holding that police information gathering is not a
"search" is that the citizen had already exposed the matter to a private
third party-for example, a bank,68 a telephone company,69 a garbage
collector,70 or a commercial pilot flying over a residential backyard.7'
The Supreme Court reasons in such cases that the citizen cannot then
reasonably expect the same information to remain private from police
officers, even if they have no reason for suspicion-an illogical conclu-
sion, but one that is made to seem plausible by the emphasis on the
citizen's conduct and expectations, rather than on the government's
conduct.
D. The Compelling State Interest Defense
The strict scrutiny formula has come under increasing scrutiny
itself by federal law scholars representing a spectrum of political ideol-
ogies.72 A common and convincing criticism of the strict scrutiny
framework is that it disparages constitutional rights by its very form: it
postulates that the government may discriminate against a "suspect
67 GEORGE ORaWLL, 1984 (1949). He wrote:
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at
any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police
plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable
that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in
your wire whenever they wanted to.
Id. at 4.
68 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
69 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
70 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
71 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
72 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 6. See generally PUBUC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (A collection of essays based on remarks deliv-
ered at Albany Law School's Conference on Compelling Government Interests: The
Mystery of Constitutional Analysis. The conference papers are published at 55 ALB. L.
REV. 535-761 (1992). Contributing authors debated the place and the propriety of a
judicial philosophy that calculates the importance of government "interests" asserted
to "trump" claims of individual rights, such as rights to equal protection or freedom
of speech.).
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class" or even override "fundamental rights" if the public (or govern-
ment?) need to do so is important enough to satisfy the court.73
Moreover, the word "compelling" is a misnomer: few laws are really
passed under "compulsion."74 It is a question of words-of seman-
tics-but semantics are important in law. Is it sensible to call a state's
asserted policy "compelling" if that state and others can freely reject
that policy and choose the opposite one? For example, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the state's "compelling interest" in
protecting its child abuse information prevents full disclosure to the
defense of the confidential records of a complaining witness.75 But
the Massachusetts high court, for one, did not feel compelled to with-
hold such records, holding rather that disclosure was the state's con-
stitutional obligation.7
6
Remarkably unpopular among the states is the Supreme Court's
assertion of what constituted a compelling interest in Moran v.
Burbine.77 In that case, police officers had refused to inform a suspect
in custody that an attorney, retained by his sister to represent him, was
trying to reach him; defendant then waived his rights and confessed.
The Supreme Court found no violation of the Fifth or Sixth Amend-
ments, reasoning that "[a] dmissions of guilt are more than merely
'desirable,' they are essential to society's compelling interest in find-
ing, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."'78 But the
importance of obtaining convictions did not compel California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Ore-
gon to allow conduct that their state constitution forbids. 79 And what
are we to think when, after the Supreme Court rules that a particular
73 See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests and Constitutional
Discourse, 55 ALs. L. REv. 549, 549 (1992).
74 Linde, supra note 16, at 951.
75 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-61 (1987) (substituting in camera
review of those records by the trial judge).
76 Commonwealth v. Stockhamer, 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991) (holding that the
criminal defendant was entitled under Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to review
complainant's psychiatric treatment records).
77 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
78 Id. at 426 (citation omitted).
79 See, e.g., People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 930 (ll. 1994) (holding that po-
lice efforts to prevent retained counsel from contacting his client, who had waived his
rights and was being interviewed by the police, required suppression of defendant's
statements); State v. Haynes, 602 P.2d 272, 277 (Or. 1979) ("[A]ny statement or the
fruits of any statement obtained after the police themselves know of the attorney's
efforts to reach the arrested person cannot be rendered admissible on the theory that
the person knowingly and intelligently waived counsel."); STATE CONsTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 1, at 695-97 & nn.49-54 (citing cases).
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state "interest" overrides a competing constitutional right, the very
state affected disagrees? The Supreme Court agreed with the Michi-
gan Attorney General that detecting and punishing drunk drivers
through a sobriety roadblock program outweighed motorists' constitu-
tional privacy rights,80 but on remand, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan did not find the state's interest so weighty. It invalidated the
program as a violation of the state search and seizure clause.8'
Another difficulty with the compelling interest standard is that
the Supreme Court does not always make clear whether the asserted
serious potential harm to the state is a matter left merely to argument,
or whether it must be proven with evidence. The Hawai'i Supreme
Court, in a recent application of "strict scrutiny," at least required the
state to demonstrate factually how the public would be harmed by en-
forcing the state constitutional right to be free of discrimination on
the basis of sex (a "suspect class" in Hawai'i).82 This is a better ap-
proach than not putting the state to its proof, but is it not fair to ask
why a government's asserted need to discriminate should be allowed,
potentially, to override individual rights at all?
The constitutional text itself provides plenty of "handholds" for
interpretation. The Hawai'i Constitution states: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account
of sex."83 This sounds fairly absolute: questions for the court would be
whether entering into marriage is a "right," and whether this right was
denied on account of the sex of the prospective marriage partner.
Further, the Hawai'i Constitution also provides: "No person
shall... be denied equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the
enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in
the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry."8 4 The
opportunity to enter into a legal marriage is either a civil right, or it is
not; the plaintiffs who wished to marry were either discriminated
against in the exercise of this civil right on account of sex, or they
were not. Adding a government "defense of necessity" to sex discrimi-
nation is pragmatically appealing, because it may serve to flush out
unforeseen adverse consequences of a proposed ruling, allowing the
80 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
81 See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993).
82 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding law prohibiting same-sex
marriage was sex-discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional unless narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling state interest), on remand sub. nom, Baehr v. Miike, Civ.
No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (holding, after extensive
findings of fact, state failed to meet this burden).
83 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3.
84 HAw. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
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court to rule with more confidence about its ultimate effect. How-
ever, neither the form nor the substance of this defense is found in
the constitutional text, which, moreover, supplies two standards that
are stricter and more specific than a broad promise of "equal protec-
tion." The point is not whether the court was right to find that deny-
ing same sex couples the right to marry might be unconstitutional sex
discrimination-that may or may not be the case in other states. The
point is whether use of federal strict scrutiny methodology was the
best, or most logical, way to analyze the problem. The text suggests,
rather, that one's rights, absolute or qualified, be defined "up front."
If there are defenses to state-sponsored sex discrimination, they
should be plausibly linked to the constitutional language, or the
demonstrated intent behind it.85
IV. CONCLUSION
Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard recently wrote that "state
judges [aspire] to be independent sources of law."8 6 There is much
evidence, both in the published opinions, and in judges' published
articles, 7 that he is correct. This aspiration became the basis for my
remarks at the Chief Justices' meeting; it is still the reason that I
devote most of my professional writing to the topic of state constitu-
tional rights. This can be a lonely job: many, if not most professors of
law, worked as clerks for federal judges, and view state constitutional
law as distinctly minor league. Law schools with hopes for national
prestige also tend to neglect the state judiciary, unfairly, and unwisely.
Most of them do not "aspire" to be a source of help to judges and
scholars working in state constitutional law. I am sure I speak for my
colleagues on the state constitutional law panel, Professor Williams
and Professor Tarr, when I say we welcome the suggestions and the
questions and-most of all-the published opinions-ofjudges labor-
ing in the field, often without adequate help from the bar. Very little
about a justice's professional life is easy, this subject. included; but
then very few subjects offer the same opportunities for unfettered, cre-
ative judgment as this one.
85 I don't mean to single out the Hawai'i court for criticism: it is a skilled and
responsible court, whose work I admire. Moreover, I do not know whether the court
received any independent briefing on the state provisions that proposed a test other
than strict scrutiny. No matter what the state's text says, federal methodology is nearly
universal in state equality decisions.
86 Shepard, supra note 11, at 432.
87 A bibliography of articles by state supreme court judges writing on the topic of
state constitutional law lists over 70 such articles and it is not complete. See STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 831.
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